Chapter X
Endnotes
1 "The saga of a people's refusal to bow before a foreign aggressor has been written many times in this war, especially throughout Europe. But in the Pacific, it fell to the Filipino to show the world that the love for freedom and democracy was not an exclusive quality of the Occident." Manila Free Philippines, May 19, 1945, Editorial, p. 2.
2 A good indication of the extent and severity of Japanese anti-guerrilla measures is evident in the captured records of court trials held in the Philippines. These records list the names of hundreds of Filipinos who were tried and summarily sentenced to death or to long prison terms on charges of "guerrilla" or "baneful action." ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Enemy Publications, No. 398, " Trial Records of Filipino and Chinese Guerrillas and Civilians and Japanese Soldiers and Civilians," 22 Sep 45 (C).
3 The Japanese also recognized the need for reconstituting the Philippine Constabulary to assist in maintaining order, as reported by Comdr. Charles Parsons in June 1943: "The kempei (military police) soldiers are being gradually replaced by Filipino policemen, and as the reorganized Philippine Constabulary soldiers are trained and sent to the various provincial units to take over the maintenance of law and order, treatment of the civil population may be expected to be even better." GHQ, SWPA, G-2 Information Bulletin," Report on Conditions in the Philippine Islands," Jun 43.
4 The geographical subdivision of the Philippines and the deliberate formation in semi-independent corps were elements in a projected resistance movement; this was the issue between General Wainwright and General Homma in their surrender meeting on Bataan on 6 May 1942. General Wainwright initially claimed that his authority did not extend beyond Luzon whereas General Homma insisted on the surrender of all forces in the Philippines. The territorial organization for the mobilization of the Philippine divisions formed the nucleus and administrative rallying areas for the resistance movement in its organizational phase.
5 Letter to Fermin Caram, Japanese Puppet Governor of Iloilo Province, Panay, 20 Feb 43. Philippines Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
6 This was why we kept fighting; this was why we continued to hope. We believed in Quezon and in the fighting spirit of the Philippines. We believed in MacArthur-and America." Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, pp. 176-177.
7 In addressing the Philippine Congress on 9 July 1945, General MacArthur praised the spirit and resistance of the Filipino people in the following words: "Your combat record on Bataan and the magnificent spiritual and physical resistance of the great masses of your people to the enemy efforts at pacification has given to the world the true strength of your character and established your undisputed spiritual capacity for self-government under any standards...." Manila Free Philippines, July 10, 1945, p. 3.
8 For a detailed history of the growth, problems, and activities of the various guerrilla groups on each island in the Philippines see G-2, GHQ, FEC, Intelligence Series, Vol I, "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, "hereinafter cited as: The Guerrilla Resistance Movement. See also Vol II, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation," hereinafter cited as: Intelligence Activities in the Philippines. These were published as war records and have been distributed to U.S. Army service schools.
9 The first radio contacts with the Philippine guerrillas were established by station KFS in San Francisco and were relayed to station KAZ in Darwin, Australia. In November 1942, KFS established contact with Maj. Ralph B. Praeger in northern Luzon and with Col. Macario Peralta in Panay. Shortly afterwards, KAZ made direct communication with station WZE in Panay. Cebu and Negros were contacted in early 1943. Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, pp. 12-13.
10 Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, pp. 10-12.
11 Ibid., pp. 12-14.
12 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
13 In recounting his journey to Manila, Major Cruz quoted General MacArthur as saying in farewell, " Cruz, this is a very tough job. Personally, I believe you have no chance to get through. With your connection to President Quezon you have become very well known. I give you 10 percent chance to enter Manila, but honestly I believe you have no chance to get out." Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, Vol II, Documentary Appendices, Appendix XX, p. 1.
14 In this class may also be included the Pulahanes and Ganaps, who were backed by the Japanese and remained under their influence. To counteract the effect of guerrilla activities, the Japanese tried to set up pro-Japanese organizations among the Filipinos. One such ineffectual attempt on Luzon is described by Colonel Kobayashi, G-3, Fourteenth Area Army, as follows: "Because the American-supported guerrillas were extremely active we tried to organize a similar group called the Ganap to guard the roads, especially north of Manila and the food-producing area around Laguna. They were also to harass and misdirect American troops in operations after the American landings. The group was never fully organized, however, and never worked well. It had no effect on operations. While the Americans steadily received intelligence from their guerrillas, our group never gave us any information that we could use." Maj. Gen. Naotake Utsunomiya, Assistant Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army, declared that he "felt that Ganap was not fully reliable." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
15 This policy was emphasized in GHQ's instructions to its agent in Mindoro: "You should carefully refrain from any move which might be construed by local leaders as encouragement for more aggressive guerrilla action with a consequent bid to heavy enemy reinforcement and increased danger of detection of your position and activity. Your mission is one of secret intelligence, and while it is desired that you extend friendly co-operation to local guerrillas and loyal residents, your participation in their affairs to any greater extent could tend to compromise the success of that mission and should be carefully avoided." GHQ, SWPA, Radio to Maj. Phillips, No. 6, 13 Dec 43. Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, pp. 36- 37.
16 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
17 Ibid., p. 58.
18 The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 83-84.
19 This command comprised a tentative organization of six divisions and the "Maranao Militia Force"; the Maranao Force was composed of the proud and temperamental Mohammedan Moros who maintained a separate group within the Mindanao guerrillas. Less than half of these forces were armed, however, and because of their poor training and outmoded weapons their fighting potential could not be judged by their numerical strength. Ibid., p. 85.
In treating the subject of guerrilla forces and organization it must be borne in mind that there was an understandable tendency on the part of their leaders to use the rather ambitious military nomenclatures of corps and divisions, based on the pre-war District mobilization pattern.
20 Ibid.
21 The tactics employed by the guerrillas in their warfare against the Japanese on Mindanao were described in an intelligence report covering the period 1-30 April 1944 issued by Headquarters, Japanese Fourteenth Area Army "(1) The bandits occupy and utilize key points of communications, firing on and making surprise attacks against our military traffic. They flee whenever we attack. (2) They construct obstacles on the roads and destroy bridges and, when we are engaged in clearing the way or in repair work, they execute surprise attacks. (3) By cutting wires, kidnapping people, burning homes, and other actions calculated to disturb the peace, they draw out our forces; they execute aggressive attacks on a considerable scale. (4) The enemy draws us out by using small units and then carries out an enveloping attack with his main force. When our forces outnumber theirs, the enemy, particularly the Moros, lies in wait in jungle areas for our return and attacks fiercely." ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Enemy Publications, No. 359, Part I, 28 Apr 45, p. 7.
22 Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, on the Mindanao Operation, Victor V, pp. 3, 17, 23, 35, 43, 55.
23 The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 69-72.
24 Ibid., p. 77. Capt. Abcede was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on 1 October 1944.
25 Ibid., pp. 35-37. Many of the puppet officials installed by the Japanese on Cebu worked secretly with the Cushing-Fenton guerrillas. A noteworthy example of such an official was Hilario Abellana, pre-war Governor of Cebu, who escaped from the Japanese in July 1943 and joined the Cebu guerrillas. He proved invaluable to the guerrillas by giving them aid in carrying on civil government functions, raising funds, and looking after the interests of the free civilian communities.
26 Ibid., pp. 37-58.
27 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
28 Manila Free Philippines, June 7, 1945, p. 4.
29 Maj. Kohei Takahashi, who served as staff officer with both the Japanese Thirty-fifth Army and the Fourteenth Area Army, made the following comment on useful intelligence furnished by the Cebu guerrillas to the Allied forces " When the U.S. task force raided Cebu City in September 1944, it hit only the buildings occupied by the Japanese Army. No other places were hit. This was far from an accident. It was due to knowledge acquired through the guerrillas."Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
30 Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, on the Panay-Negros and Cebu Operations, Victor I and II, p. 59. HQ Eighth Army, Operational Monograph on the Cebu-Bohol, Negros Oriental Operation, Victor II, pp. 13 -14.
31 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
32 The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 46-51.
33 Ibid.
34 Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, on the Panay-Negros and Cebu Operations, Victor I and II, pp. 18-45 ; GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1080, 22 Mar 45.
35 The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 1-3.
36 A captured Fourteenth Area Army intelligence report concerning the guerrillas on Leyte contained the following statement: "The bandit groups in every area, particularly the Kangleon bandit group (Leyte), have blind faith in the return of the American forces.... They are preparing for an uprising simultaneously with the return of the American forces and are laying plans to link up with them." ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Enemy Publications, No. 359, Part I, 28 Apr 45, p. 4.
37 The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 5-8.
38 Ibid.
39 Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 92. The Japanese were much concerned with the plans of the guerrillas to rise up against them simultaneously with the American invasion of the Philippines. In an intelligence report issued by Fourteenth Area Army Headquarters, covering the period 1-30 April 1944, the following information was given: "The bandit groups have become more and more aggressive.. .. they appear to be planning an uprising simultaneously with the return of the American forces, and in the meantime are conserving their forces and building up their military strength. They are directing most of their efforts toward reconnaissance of our forces, principally of our defense formations, and toward fifth column destruction of our rear lines of communications units." ATIS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Enemy Publications, No. 359, Part I, 26 Apr 45, p. 3.
40 HQ Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, p. 79.
41 The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, p. 9.
42 Ibid., pp. 10-24. The commander of this organization was a natural leader, Col. Marcos V. Agustin. A fearless fighter, he was aided by the brilliant Yay Panlillo, Filipino woman journalist, whom he later married.
43 Colonel Kobayashi, G-3, Fourteenth Area Army, paid tribute to Major (later Colonel) Anderson in the following words: "About the middle of October 1944, we attempted to extirpate the guerrilla movement in Luzon. Unfortunately for us, however, Colonel Anderson was too good a leader and the American guerrillas continued to function.... In recalling the final stage of the war in the Philippines ... I remember how famous Colonel Anderson became among us." Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
44 The Guerrilla Resistance Movement, pp. 39-42.
45 Ibid., pp. 43-44. Major Volckmann was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on 9 October 1944.
46 G-3, HQ Sixth Army, Combat Notes, No. 5, 21 Mar 45, pp. 1-10.
47 GHQ, SWPA, Special Communique No. 1054, 24 Feb 45; HQ 32 Div, " Daily Summary of Enemy Information" No. 73, 26 Apr 45.
48 Manila Free Philippines, June 2, 1945, p. 3.
49 GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1063, 5 Mar 45.
50 GHQ, SWPA, Communique No. 1079, 21 Mar 45.
51 General Muto explained this penetration in the following words: "Filipino guerrilla units penetrated the jungle and appeared at our rear. The initial force of some 115 men increased to 200 the following day, and by the third day the group expanded into a complete unit augmented by American troops, who then occupied key positions behind our front lines." Unpublished memoirs of Lt. Gen. Akira Muto: Hito Sakusen no Shinso-The Truth of the Philippines Campaign, 15 Jun 47, p. 52, G-2, GHQ, FEC.
52 GHQ, SWPA, Special Release, 25 Oct 44.
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